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One of the most consistent observations in human
functional imaging is that a network of brain regions
referred to as the ‘‘default network’’ increases its
activity during passive states. Here we explored the
anatomy and function of the default network across
three studies to resolve divergent hypotheses about
its contributions to spontaneous cognition and ac-
tive forms of decision making. Analysis of intrinsic
activity revealed the network comprises multiple,
dissociated components. A midline core (posterior
cingulate and anterior medial prefrontal cortex) is
active when people make self-relevant, affective
decisions. In contrast, a medial temporal lobe sub-
system becomes engaged when decisions involve
constructing a mental scene based on memory.
During certain experimentally directed and sponta-
neous acts of future-oriented thought, these dissoci-
ated components are simultaneously engaged, pre-
sumably to facilitate construction of mental models
of personally significant events.
INTRODUCTION
When individuals are left to think to themselves undisturbed, a
specific network of brain regions becomes engaged. This net-
work, referred to as the default network, was originally observed
during passive, experimental control tasks that were included in
a variety of studies (Shulman et al., 1997; Mazoyer et al., 2001).
Raichle and colleagues (Raichle et al., 2001; Gusnard and
Raichle, 2001) drew attention to the network and suggested
that its ubiquitous appearance in default states signals an essen-
tial, adaptive function. The network has since received growing
attention because of its alteration in neurological and psychiatric
disorders (Buckner et al., 2008; Broyd et al., 2009). However,
despite the widespread interest there has not been consensus
on the default network’s functions or even whether its presence
signifies an adaptive contribution to cognition (Gilbert et al.,
2007; Morcom and Fletcher, 2007). The present series of studies550 Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.sought to resolve these discrepancies by dissecting its anatomy
and function.
Possible functions of the default network are suggested by
two sources of evidence. The first source comes from studies
of directed tasks that cause activity increases in regions within
the default network. Anatomically, the default network com-
prises regions along the anterior and posterior midline, the lateral
parietal cortex, prefrontal cortex, and the medial temporal lobe
(Buckner et al., 2008). Tasks that encourage subjects toward
internal mentation, including autobiographical memory, thinking
about one’s future, theory of mind, self-referential and affective
decision making, tend to activate regions within the default
network (reviewed in Ochsner et al., 2004; Buckner et al.,
2008; Spreng et al., 2009).
A challenge to the field has been to disentangle such high-level
tasks into component processes. Some have suggested a role
for components of the default network in scene construction
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2007), contextual associations (Bar,
2007), and conceptual processing (Binder et al., 2009). Others
have suggested a role for the default network in social (Mitchell,
2006; Schilbach et al., 2008), self-referential, or affective cogni-
tion (Gusnard et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 2003; D’Argembeau
et al., 2005, 2009) with minimal emphasis on mnemonic or
prospective processes (but see D’Argembeau et al., 2009).
Schacter and Addis (2007) highlighted that future-oriented
thoughts, which strongly drive activity in the default network,
are inherently constructive, building on multiple episodic memo-
ries. They further argued that mental simulation based on
memory is a core process of future-oriented cognition (Schacter
et al., 2007). The divergence across these perspectives, perhaps
exemplified best by the different emphases in Hassabis and Ma-
guire’s scene construction model (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007)
and D’Argembeau et al.’s emphasis on self-referential cognition
(D’Argembeau et al., 2005, 2009), suggests that the default
network likely comprises multiple interacting subsystems (e.g.,
Hassabis et al., 2007a; Buckner et al., 2008).
The second source of evidence about the function of the
default network comes from examination of what people think
about during passive task states. Associations between default
network activity and spontaneous thoughts have emerged in
multiple studies (e.g., McKiernan et al., 2006; Mason et al.,
2007; Christoff et al., 2009). In terms of content, individuals
report spontaneously thinking about personally significant or
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portion of which possess a future orientation (Andreasen et al.,
1995; J.R.A.-H. and R.L.B., unpublished data). Other re-
searchers have emphasized the social aspects of spontaneous
thought (Mitchell, 2006; Schilbach et al., 2008). Despite these
observations, it remains unclear why the specific regions within
the default network activate together during passive epochs
and how they might support the kinds of internal mentation
reported by participants.
In this paper, we conducted a detailed characterization of the
architecture of the default network using analysis of intrinsic
connectivity combined with graph-analytic and clustering tech-
niques. Next, task-based functional MRI (fMRI) was employed
to explore the differential contributions of the component
systems comprising the default network. Participants made
decisions about themselves in the future with task variations
constructed to manipulate self-referential processing and the
demands for de novo construction of an imagined scene. As
the results will reveal, the task variations differentially modulated
distinct components of the default network. We further exam-
ined the functions of the dissociated components by exploring
the nature of strategies used during each task trial. These disso-
ciated components contribute differentially to two processes
common during spontaneous thought: construction of imagined
events and assessment of their personal significance.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
The Default Network Comprises Two Subsystems
that Interact with a Common Core
In order to characterize the architecture of the default network,
intrinsic functional connectivity MRI (fcMRI) was used to extract
low-frequency spontaneous blood oxygenation level-dependent
(BOLD) fluctuations within 11 a priori midline and lateral regions
within the default network (Figures 1A and 1B; Table S1). The
fluctuations within the a priori regions were then examined in
an independent group of young adults using graph-analytic tech-
niques and hierarchical clustering analysis on the interregional
correlation matrix.
Results revealed that the default network comprises a large-
scale interacting brain system—no single region was completely
dissociated from the remaining regions. However, local structure
that was not captured by considering it as a single, coherent
system was also apparent. Graph-analytic techniques revealed
a core set of hubs, including posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)
and anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), defined by their
significant (p < 0.001) correlations with all regions comprising the
network (Figure 1C). Consistent with prior reports (Buckner et al.,
2009; see also Hagmann et al., 2008), PCC and aMPFC exhibited
the highest betweenness centrality. Hierarchical clustering anal-
ysis on the remaining nine regions within the default network
revealed that they dissociated into two distinct subsystems
(Figure 1D). One subsystem, termed the ‘‘dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex (dMPFC) subsystem,’’ included the dMPFC, temporoparie-
tal junction (TPJ), lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and temporal pole
(TempP). The second subsystem, termed the ‘‘medial temporal
lobe (MTL) subsystem,’’ included the ventral MPFC (vMPFC),posterior inferior parietal lobule (pIPL), retrosplenial cortex (Rsp),
parahippocampal cortex (PHC),andhippocampal formation (HF+).
These initial results suggest that the default network is a
heterogeneous brain system comprised of at least two distinct
subsystems that interact with a core set of hubs. The next two
experiments sought to provide insight into the distinct functional
contributions of each component of the default network.
Experiment 2
The Default Network Subsystems Functionally
Dissociate
The second experiment explored the functional response prop-
erties of the core and subsystems identified in experiment 1
using an fMRI paradigm that allowed prospective, episodic deci-
sions about one’s self (Future Self) to be compared to self-refer-
ential decisions concerning one’s present situation or mental
state (Present Self). Based on prior findings from memory and
social cognitive neuroscience studies, we hypothesized that
while both conditions might activate the midline core, the Future
Self condition would preferentially activate the MTL subsystem,
and the Present Self condition would preferentially activate the
dMPFC subsystem. Additionally, the two experimental condi-
tions were referenced to parallel control conditions that relied
on nonpersonal semantic knowledge (Future Non-Self Control
and Present Non-Self Control). Thus, the 2 3 2 Self-Relevancy
(Self,Non-Self Control)3 Temporal Orientation (Present, Future)
experimental paradigm allowed us to examine how distinct
processes differentially map onto the default network compo-
nents.
Behavioral Results. Behavioral strategy probes obtained
immediately following the scanning session confirmed that the
conditions differed as expected. Large differences in partici-
pants’ sense of self-projection were observed between the Self
and Non-Self (semantic) Control conditions (Present Self =
5.22 ± 0.39; Present Non-Self Control = 1.77 ± 0.46; Future
Self = 6.88 ± 0.23; Future Non-Self Control = 1.93 ± 0.27). These
differences yielded significant main effects (Self-Relevancy:
F(1,17) = 190.8, p < 0.001; Temporal Orientation: F(1,17) =
27.4, p < 0.001) and a significant interaction (F(1,17) = 7.6,
p < 0.05). Differences were also observed in participants’ re-
ported use of mental imagery (Present Self = 5.82 ± 0.32;Present
Control = 5.37 ± 0.33; Future Self = 7.28 ± 0.25; Future Control =
4.80 ± 0.27). Specifically, there was a significant main effect
(F(1,17) = 10.0, p < 0.005) with mental imagery rated stronger
for the two Self conditions, no main effect of Temporal Orienta-
tion (F(1,17) = 2.0, p = 0.18), and a significant interaction
(F(1,17) = 15.8, p < 0.001). Vividness ratings paralleled mental
imagery and also varied across conditions. A main effect of
Self-Relevancy (F(1,17) = 11.0, p < 0.005), no main effect of
Temporal Orientation (F(1,17) = 1.35, p = 0.26), and a significant
interaction (F(1,17) = 8.76, p < 0.01) was observed.
Of note, the Future Self condition showed the highest levels of
self-projection, experienced mental imagery, and vividness,
suggesting that thinking about oneself in the future may simulta-
neously engage a number of component processes subserved
by subsystems that comprise the default network. This observa-
tion provides an important clue about why constructed thoughts
about one’s future may activate such a widely distributed set ofNeuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 551
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Figure 1. Intrinsic Functional Connectivity
Reveals that the Default Network Is
Comprised of a Midline Core and Two
Distinct Subsystems
(A) Eleven a priori regions within the default
network were defined using low-frequency
intrinsic connectivity approaches in a group of 28
adults. The regions are shown overlain on trans-
verse slices colored according to the subsystems
revealed in (C) and (D).
(B) Regions are also projected onto a surface
template (Caret software, Van Essen, 2005).
(C) Functional correlation strengths between the
11 regions were extracted in an independent sam-
ple of participants and examined for clustering pro-
perties using the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, which
pulls strongly correlated regions near each other
and pushes weakly correlated regions farther
apart. The thicknessof the lines reflects the strength
of the correlation between regions. The dotted
line demonstrates a negative correlation. Only sig-
nificant correlations at p < 0.001 are included in
the analysis. The size of the circles represents
a measure of betweenness-centrality, a graph-
analytic metric that rep-resents how central a node
is in a network (see text). The two regions with the
highest betweenness-centrality are anterior medial
prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) and posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), reflecting a core set of ‘‘hubs’’ within
the default network (colored yellow accordingly).
(D)Hierarchicalclusteringanalysiswasperformed to investigatewhether the remaining regionswithmore limitedconnectionalpropertiesgrouped intodistinct subsys-
tems. Two clusters representing subsystems emerged. The first subsystem (colored in blue and referred to as the ‘‘dorsal medial prefrontal cortex subsystem’’)
included dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and temporal pole (TempP). The second subsystem
(colored ingreenand referred toas the ‘‘medial temporal lobesubsystem’’) includedventralMPFC(vMPFC),posterior inferior parietal lobule (pIPL), retrosplenial cortex
(Rsp), parahippocampal cortex (PHC), and hippocampal formation (HF+).
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The Brain’s Default Networkbrain regions. Experiment 3 will expand upon this observation by
considering the differential use of strategies across conditions
and whether their use tracks functional-anatomic distinctions
between default network components.
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that condi-
tions varied significantly with respect to response time (RT)
(F(3,51) = 8.12, p < 0.001; Present Self = 5696 ms ± 179 ms;
Present Non-Self Control = 6642 ms ± 125 ms; Future Self =
6185ms± 147ms; Future Non-Self Control = 6500ms± 160ms),
a variable that has been shown to influence activity within the
default network (e.g., McKiernan et al., 2003). In order to ensure
that differences in activation patterns between the conditions
were not simply the result of RT differences, all regional analyses
werecomputedafter controlling for thismeasure. Specifically,we
performed a linear regression between the group-averaged
percent signal change on a trial-by-trial basis (dependent
measure) and the group-averaged RT on a trial-by-trial basis
(independent measure) and saved the residuals for subsequent
analyses. For this reason, when viewing the figures, the sign of
the percent signal change should not be interpreted because
the residuals sum to zero.
Imaging Results. The mean activity (representing percent
signal change after controlling for RT) was computed by aver-
aging the percent signal change across the regions comprising
the core as well as each of the two subsystems (Figure 2). Three
distinct patterns emerged consistent with our hypotheses. The552 Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.core showed strong activation in both conditions where subjects
made autobiographical (Self) decisions (Figure 2A). The two
subsystems, however, showed selective activation increases.
The dMPFC subsystem was preferentially engaged when partic-
ipants made self-referential judgments about their present situa-
tion or mental states (Figure 2B), whereas the MTL subsystem
was preferentially engaged during episodic judgments about
the personal future (Figure 2C). These observations were all
confirmed by statistical tests (see Table S2).
Preliminary insight into the processing contributions of one of
the subsystems was revealed by trial-to-trial variance in imagery
ratings. Ratings of visual imagery correlated with activity in the
MTL subsystem (r(70) = 0.39, p < 0.005, significant at a Bonfer-
roni-corrected a of 0.008) but not significantly for the core (r(70) =
0.19, p = 0.11) or the dMPFC subsystem (r(70) = 0.00, p = 0.98).
Thus, trials rated as eliciting appreciable amounts of visual
imagery tended to be associated with greater activity within
the MTL subsystem. Additionally, ratings of self-projection
strongly correlated with fMRI activity in the MTL subsystem
and the core and marginally in the dMPFC subsystem (dMPFC:
r(70) = 0.22, p = 0.06; MTL: r(70) = 0.38, p < 0.001; core: r(70) =
0.313, p < 0.01; the MTL and core were both significant at a
Bonferroni-corrected a of 0.008). Note that estimated use of
imagery and self-projection were not independent, even when
variance within a condition was examined. For example, imagery
and self-projection estimates were highly correlated across
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Figure 2. Functional Dissociation of Default Network Components
Percent signal change controlled for trial-by-trial differences in response time
is plotted for each conditionwithin the core and the two subsystems as defined
by intrinsic connectivity analysis in Figure 1.
(A) The mean activity within the regions comprising the core exhibits a main
effect of Self > Non-Self Control trials, but no difference based on temporal
context. Functional task dissociations were revealed for the subsystems
comprising the default network.
(B) The dMPFC subsystem is preferentially activated when participants make
self-referential decisions about their present situation or mental states.
(C) In contrast, the MTL subsystem exhibits preferential activity when partici-
pants make decisions about their personal future. Note that since the activity
magnitudes were controlled for RT, the zero value and +/ sign are relative.
Axes are plotted to maintain visual consistency across figures. PRSNT
SELF, present self; PRSNT CTRL, present non-self control; FUTURE CTRL,
future non-self control. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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correlations, however, suggested to us a way to gain insight into
the component processing contributions of the functional-
anatomical components. We will return to analysis of correla-
tions between subsystem activity and reported strategy use in
experiment 3.
Exploratory Whole-Brain Analyses Confirm Functional
Dissociation
The above analyses demonstrate a compelling dissociation
between the core and subsystems within the larger defaultnetwork. To further explore these dissociations, we analyzed
the critical contrasts at a map-wise level without making
assumptions about the architecture of the default network.
Such exploratory analyses provide an independent means of
describing functional differences. Two contrasts were explored:
Self versusNon-Self Control and Future Self versus Present Self.
The first contrast isolates those regions preferentially activated
by tasks involving referencing information to one’s self, whereas
the second contrast selectively isolates differences between the
two self-referential conditions.
Results revealed increased activity notably within the aMPFC
and PCC core regions for the Self compared to Non-Self Control
conditions. In addition, several regions that fell within both
subsystems were also activated by the main effect contrast,
including dMPFC, TPJ, pIPL, Rsp, and TempP (Figure 3). The
contrast between the two Self conditions confirmed the dissoci-
ation between the two subsystems observed in the ROI analyses
with a particularly clean isolation of theMTL subsystem. As high-
lighted in Figure 4, the regions that preferentially activate during
self-relevant predictions about one’s future nearly identically
(and selectively) overlap the regions that define the MTL
subsystem. These regions include bilateral vMPFC, Rsp, pIPL,
PHC, and HF+. In contrast, regions comprising the dMPFC
subsystem were more active during decisions about one’s pres-
ent situation or mental state (dMPFC, TPJ, TempP), although
a number of additional regions associated with a frontoparietal
control system (bilateral middle/superior frontal gyrus, right
ventrolateral PFC, bilateral insula, anterior cingulate cortex,
and anterior inferior parietal sulcus) were also observed. Taken
collectively, these results confirm the dissociations observed
in the hypothesis-driven contrasts with particularly strong evi-
dence for the core and MTL subsystem.
Item-Analysis Confirms Functional Dissociation
The results of the intrinsic connectivity analysis suggest that the
default network clusters into two distinct subsystems, with
strong intrinsic correlations between the individual regions com-
prising each subsystem. Our next objective was to examine
whether regions within each subsystem track together during
task performance. If so, these results would provide additional
support for the presence of subsystems within the default
network. To investigate these questions, the mean percent sig-
nal change for the four conditions was plotted separately for
each region comprising the distinct subsystems. Regions com-
prising the same subsystems exhibit very similar patterns of
activity, while regions comprising distinct subsystems exhibit
relatively different patterns of activity (Figures S1 and S2).
Next, we took advantage of the study’s large sample size
to estimate trial-by-trial activity magnitudes independent of
condition and to calculate interregional activity correlations.
The degrees to which individual subsystem regions correlated
with other regions within the same subsystem (e.g., PHC with
pIPL), with the core regions (e.g., PHC with aMPFC), and with
the regions comprising distinct subsystems (e.g., PHC with
dMPFC) were all quantified. Consistent with the intrinsic activity
correlations in experiment 1, themean trial-by-trial activity corre-
lation between all pairs of regions comprising each subsystem
(n = 16 pair-wise correlations) was strong (Figure 5A; mean
r = 0.45, one-sample t test: t(15) = 7.98, p < 0.001, significantNeuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 553
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Figure 3. Whole-Brain Analyses Reveal the
Role of the Midline Core in Self-Referential
Processing
Whole-brain exploratory analyses were conducted
using the main effect contrast of Self trials versus
Non-Self Control trials. Results are projected
onto a surface template (Caret software; Van Es-
sen, 2005) and are also illustrated in slices (both,
p < 0.0001 uncorrected). Warm colors represent
greater activation during Self trials, whereas cool
colors represent greater activation during Non-
Self Control trials. Increased activation during
Self trials was observed prominently in (A) PCC
and (B) aMPFC cores, as well as in (C) dMPFC,
(D) Rsp, (E) TPJ, (F) pIPL, (G) LTC, and (H) TempP.
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tion between each region comprising the two subsystems and
the two regions comprising the core (n = 18 pair-wise correla-
tions) was also strong, confirming the role of the core as
hubs within the default network (mean r = 0.31, one-sample
t test: t(17) = 9.21, p < 0.001). In contrast, pair-wise correlations
between regions comprising distinct subsystems (n = 20 pair-
wise correlations) were near zero, highlighting the distinct nature
of the two subsystems (mean r = 0.05, one-sample t test:
t(19) = 1.19, p = 0.25). Finally, the two regions comprising the
core were strongly correlated with each other (aMPFC with
PCC: r(70) = 0.61, p < 0.001).
Next, the interregional activity correlation matrix (9 3 9)
between all pairs of regions calculated above (minus the hubs)
was analyzed using hierarchical clustering to examine shared
task-related variance between the regions in a data-driven
manner. Mirroring the intrinsic connectivity results from experi-
ment 1, the dMPFC, TPJ, LTC, and TempP and the vMPFC,
pIPL, Rsp, PHC, and HF formed distinct clusters (Figure 5B).
The regions within the MTL subsystem exhibited the identical
pattern as revealed by intrinsic connectivity (compare Fig-
ure 1D to 5B), whereas the regions within the dMPFC subsystem
clustered together but showed a different organizational struc-
ture. Whereas intrinsic connectivity grouped the LTC and TempP
closest to one another within the dMPFC subsystem, the LTC
exhibited task-related activity that correlated best with the TPJ.554 Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Collectively, these results indicate that
regions comprising the subsystems and
core act as functionally coherent units
during task performance, exhibiting both
correlation and independence as pre-
dicted by the analyses in experiment 1.
Experiment 3
Analysis of Component Processes
Supported by the Core
and Subsystems
To gain insight into the component pro-
cesses supported by the dissociated
network components, including how
they might combine together during
certain forms of experimentally directedand passive tasks, the third experiment conducted a detailed
analysis of the reported strategies that tracked activity differ-
ences. Specifically, we examined the reported strategies used
for each of the questions in relation to the evoked activity to
better understand the nature of the supported processes.
Strategy probes were diverse and examined a range of
possible component strategies, including whether individual
trials relied on episodic memory, use of imagination, specific
mental images that involved scenes, affective content including
feelings and emotions, and self-referenced ideations. Several
results from the strategy probes confirmed expected differences
between the conditions, bolstering confidence in the approach
(see Table S3 for ratings). For example, strategy probe #8 asked
to what degree participants thought about the future while
answering the questions. As expected, responses were consid-
erably higher for the future-oriented conditions (Future Self and
Future Non-Self Control). Strategy probe question #11 asked
about the overall effort exerted to answer the questions. The
reported subjective responses paralleled the response time
differences observed between conditions (with the two Control
conditions showing the greatest effort). Additionally, strategy
probe #9 asked whether factual as opposed to subjective infor-
mation was relied upon when answering the questions. Both of
the Non-Self Control conditions showed the highest factual
response properties consistent with their focus on general
semantic knowledge.
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Figure 4. Whole-Brain Analyses Highlight
the MTL Subsystem when Participants Envi-
sion Themselves in the Future
Whole-brain exploratory analyses were conducted
using the simple effect contrast Future Self versus
Present Self, projected onto a surface template
and illustrated in slices (both, p < 0.0001 uncor-
rected). Warm colors represent greater activation
during Future Self trials, whereas cool colors repre-
sent greater activation during Present Self trials.
Increased activation during Future Self trials was
observed selectively in regions comprising the
MTL subsystem, including bilateral (A) PHC, (B)
HF+, (C) vMPFC, (D) pIPL, and (E) Rsp. In contrast,
a number of regions within and outside the dMPFC
subsystem were recruited more during Present
Self trials: i.e., (F) dMPFC, (G) TPJ, (H) LTC, and
(I) TempP. Note the lack of difference between
the two conditions was observed in the PCC and
the aPFC core regions.
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probes resulted in informative response patterns that tracked
activity in the core and the MTL subsystem (Figure 6). Three
specific strategy probes strongly tracked the observed activity
increases in the aMPFC and PCC core: personal significance
(probe #1), introspection about one’s preferences, feelings,
and emotions (i.e., mental states) (probe #2), and evoked
emotion (probe #3) (Figures 6A–6C). Across the three strategy
probes, ratings showed no Strategy 3 Self-Relevancy 3 Tem-
poral Orientation interaction (F(2,22) = 0.68, p = 0.52), no Self-
Relevancy 3 Temporal Orientation interaction (F(1,11) = 0.31,
p = 0.59), a significant main effect of Self-Relevancy (F(1,11) =
39.6, p < 0.001), and no main effect of Temporal Orientation
(F(1,11) = 0.028, p = 0.87). Thus, the three strategy probes
were similarly rated as higher for both Self conditions. When
the three variables were combined into a composite mea-
sure—which we descriptively label the ‘‘Affective Self-Referen-
tial’’ composite—the composite variable accounted for 22%
of the trial-to-trial variance in activity within the midline core
(r(64) = 0.47, p < 0.001, significant at a Bonferroni corrected
a of 0.008; Figure 7A). The Affective Self-Referential composite
also explained a considerable portion (13%) of the variance in
activity within the dMPFC subsystem (r(64) = 0.36, p < 0.005,
also significant at a Bonferroni corrected a of 0.008; Figure 7B)
and only 5% of the variance in activity within the MTL subsystem
(r(64) = 0.23, p = 0.06; Figure 7C).Neuron 65, 550–562,Three distinct strategy probes tracked
the observed activity increases in the
MTL subsystem: use of episodic memory
(probe #5), event imagination (probe #6),
and scene content (probe #7). As shown
in Figures 6D–6F, ratings across the
three strategy probes showed no
Strategy 3 Self-Relevancy 3 Time inter-
action (F(1,11) = 0.23, p = 0.80), a signifi-
cant Self-Relevancy 3 Temporal Orienta-
tion interaction (F(1,11) = 6.47, p < 0.05),a significant main effect of Self-Relevancy (F(1,11) = 5.36, p <
0.05), and a significant main effect of Temporal Orientation
(Future versus Present: F(1,11) = 24.5, p < 0.001). All three vari-
ables were rated stronger for the Future Self condition than the
Present Self condition, similar to the observed activity pattern
within the MTL subsystem (see Figure 2C). Note that this pattern
is dissociated from that observed for the Affective Self-Referen-
tial composite, which is characterized by marked activity
increases in both of the Self conditions. When the three strategy
probes were combined into a composite—which we descrip-
tively label the ‘‘Mnemonic Scene Construction’’ composite—
the composite measure accounted for 31% of the variance in
MTL subsystem activity (r(64) = 0.56, p < 0.001, significant at
a Bonferroni corrected a of 0.008; Figure 7F), but only 3% of
the variance in activity within the midline core (r(64) = 0.17, p =
0.16; Figure 7D) and 3% of the variance in the dMPFC
subsystem (r(64) = 0.17, p = 0.18; Figure 7E).
These results suggest that the core and MTL subsystem
contribute to distinct component processes that are differentially
linked to self-referential processing and memory-based scene
construction, respectively. Recognizing that these strategy
probes capture only broad sets of processes that must be
dissected further, it is notable that the distinct neural compo-
nents of the default network so clearly tracked the dissociated
component processes. Thinking about one’s self in the future,
which was characterized by extensive use of self-referentialFebruary 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 555
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Figure 5. Interregional Correlation and Clustering Analyses Confirm
Functional Dissociation
Large sample sizes permit reliable estimates of trial-by-trial activity collapsing
across conditions.
(A) Activity within each region comprising the subsystems defined from
intrinsic connectivity analysis was extracted and correlated with activity within
each of the hubs. The correlation values between each region and the two core
hubs were then averaged (left bar). Likewise, activity correlations between
regions comprising the same subsystem were averaged to reflect within-
subsystem correlations (middle bar). Finally, activity correlations between
regions comprising distinct subsystems were averaged to reflect between-
subsystem correlations (right bar). Robust correlations were observed
between regions within subsystems and between subsystems and the hubs.
However, regions belonging to distinct subsystems exhibited minimal task-
related activity correlations.
(B) Hierarchical clustering analysis on the correlation matrix between trial-
by-trial activity in each region was conducted using identical methods as in
Figure 1D to examine whether the regions dissociate functionally during tasks.
Two distinct clusters were revealed, suggesting that regions within each
subsystem exhibit similar patterns of activity but overall different patterns
from the other subsystem. Note that the cluster analysis reveals a very similar
clustering pattern between the regions comprising theMTL subsystemas illus-
trated in Figure 1D. However, the regions comprising the dMPFC subsystem
exhibited clustering patterns that were different from that revealed by intrinsic
connectivity analysis.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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The Brain’s Default Networkprocessing and concurrent processes associated with con-
structing a mental scene based on memory, maximally activated
both the core and the MTL subsystem.
DISCUSSION
Originally observed in meta-analyses of passive task data (Shul-
man et al., 1997; Mazoyer et al., 2001), the default network has556 Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.received considerable attention because of the possibility that
it participates in important functions that reflect more than a
quiescent or idling brain state (Raichle et al., 2001; Gusnard
and Raichle, 2001). Among multiple possibilities, a reemerging
theme is that the default network contributes to internal menta-
tion that becomes prominent when people are not engaged in
external interactions and their minds wander (Buckner et al.,
2008). Foreshadowed by William James, such ‘‘stream of
thought’’ may reflect what we do the majority of the time (James,
1890; Klinger and Cox, 1987), likely signaling important adaptive
functions (Singer, 1966; Klinger, 1971). The nature of the default
network’s contribution to adaptive function, however, has been
widely debated. While some theories emphasize its role in
construction of a mental scene (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007),
other theories emphasize self-referential or social processes
(Wicker et al., 2003; Mitchell, 2006; D’Argembeau et al., 2005;
Schilbach et al., 2008). Our results reveal that both of these theo-
ries are correct but account for distinct functional-anatomic
components within the default network. Moreover, the present
set of analyses show how each component may contribute to
processes common during spontaneous thought.
The Default Network Consists of a Midline Core
and Distinct Subsystems
The default network is comprised of two distinct subsystems
that converge on a midline core (Figures 1 and 5). Functional
connectivity combined with network and hierarchical clustering
analysis revealed a tightly correlatedMTL subsystem comprising
the HF+, PHC, Rsp, vMPFC, and pIPL and a distinct dMPFC
subsystem comprising the dMPFC, TPJ, LTC, and TempP.
Importantly, both subsystems strongly correlated with a midline
core that included the aMPFC and PCC. Before suggesting func-
tional attributes for the distinct components, we first discuss the
convergence between the present results and prior functional
connectivity and connectional anatomy studies.
The macaquemedial temporal lobe is anatomically connected
to the Rsp (Kobayashi and Amaral, 2003, 2007), the ventral-
caudal mPFC (Barbas et al., 1999; Kondo et al., 2005), and the
lateral parietal area 7a—the possible macaque homolog of
human pIPL (Suzuki and Amaral, 1994; Lavenex et al., 2002).
Using fcMRI in humans, we previously demonstrated that the
HF+ is intrinsically correlated with a similar set of regions,
including pIPL, Rsp, and vMPFC (Vincent et al., 2006; Kahn
et al., 2008; see also Greicius et al., 2004) and similar patterns
of connectivity have been found when examining intrinsic corre-
lations with the vMPFC and Rsp (Margulies et al., 2007, 2009).
The PCC and the aMPFC comprise a core within the default
network, and their widespread connectivity is supported by
connectional anatomy studies. In macaques, PCC exhibits
strong reciprocal connections with many of the regions com-
prising both subsystems: PHC, HF+, Rsp, MPFC, and LTC (Bar-
bas et al., 1999; Kobayashi and Amaral, 2003, 2007; Morecraft
et al., 2004). The aMPFC (area 10) is also strongly connected
with a number of medial prefrontal and posterior regions,
including ventral and dorsal MPFC, PCC, Rsp, LTC, and TempP
(Barbas et al., 1999; Price, 2007). We recently demonstrated
using unbiased voxel-wise intrinsic connectivity methods that
both the PCC and the aMPFC are ‘‘hubs’’ exhibiting high levels
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Reveals Multiple Component Processes
To further explore the component processes elic-
iting activity in the default network, an independent
sample of participants rated each stimulus on
a number of dimensions using a seven-point Likert
scale (1, not at all; 7, a lot). Three variables capture
the distinction between Self and Non-Self Control
trials, exhibiting patterns similar to the core in
Figure 2A: (A) personal significance, (B) introspec-
tion, and (C) evoked emotion. However, these vari-
ables do not account for the difference in activity
observed between Future Self and Present Self
trials. In contrast, three additional variables yielded
patterns similar to task-related brain activity within
the MTL subsystem as highest for Future Self trials
(Figure 1B). These variables include (D) memory,
(E) imagination, and (F) spatial content. PRSNT
SELF, present self; PRSNT CTRL, present non-
self control; FUTURE CTRL, future non-self
control. Error bars represent standard error of
the mean.
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The Brain’s Default Networkof distributed functional connectivity throughout the cortex
(Buckner et al., 2009; see also Hagmann et al., 2008). The PCC,
in particular, correlates with all regions that fall within the default
network, even after taking the correlation between other default
network regions into account (Fransson and Marrelec, 2008).
The Default Network Components Exhibit Distinct
Functional Contributions to Cognition
A central observation of the present paper is clear task-based
functional dissociation among the components that comprise
the default network (Figure 2). In addition, we demonstrate that
regions comprising each component show similar patterns of
activation. Thus, we extend previous functional accounts by
adopting a systems framework.
The MTL subsystem increased its activity preferentially when
participants made episodic decisions about their future. This
pattern of activity is consistent with a number of functional
imaging and neuropsychological studies highlighting the role of
the default network in both recall of the past and imagination
of the future (reviewed in Schacter et al., 2007). The commonNeuron 65, 550–562,activation during remembering and pro-
spection implies that a common set of
processes underlies these abilities. Em-
ploying strategy probes and item anal-
ysis, our results revealed that participants
used a strategy that involved construct-
ing a mental scene based on memory.
This mnemonic scene construction
strategy explained 32% of the variance
in activity within theMTL subsystem, sug-
gesting that mnemonic scene construc-
tion is an important component process
of thinking about the future (Hassabis
and Maguire, 2007). Of importance, this
set of processes is selectively supportedby the MTL subsystem and not by all components of the default
network.
The present results also hint at the possibility that the MTL
subsystem is more sensitive to the act of simulating the future
using mnemonic imagery-based processes than to temporal
aspects of the future per se. In particular, although the relation-
ship between activity within the MTL subsystem and future
thinking (item ratings for question #8 in Table S1) was robust
and significant (r = 0.68), it reduced to near zero (r = 0.03)
when controlling for the effect of mnemonic scene construction.
Consistent with this finding, patients with hippocampal amnesia
lack the ability to imagine a coherent scene presumably void
of a temporal context (Hassabis et al., 2007b; see also Hassa-
bis et al., 2007a; Addis et al., 2009). Because participants are
more likely to take part in future events that are simulated
with greater contextual detail compared to those imagined
abstractly (Gollwitzer and Brandstaetter, 1997), we suspect
that the adaptive significance of these mnemonic imagery-
based processes may be to benefit prediction accuracy and
future behavior.February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 557
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Figure 7. Variance in Activity Accounted for
by Composite Measures of Self-Related and
Episodic Information
Three variables (personal significance, introspec-
tion, and evoked emotion) rated by an indepen-
dent group of participants for each stimulus were
converted to z scores and summed to create
a composite measure of affective self-referential
cognition. This composite measure was then
treated as the independent measure in a linear
regression with activity within the (A) PCC-aMPFC
core, (B) the dMPFC subsystem, and (C) the MTL
subsystem. The affective self-referential com-
posite was found to account for a large portion of
the variance in the PCC-aMPFC core (22%) and
the dMPFC subsystem (13%), and a small portion
of the variance in the MTL subsystem (5%). Next,
three additional variables (memory, imagination,
and spatial content) were combined into a com-
posite measure of mnemonic scene construction.
This composite measure explained a small
percentage of the variance in activity within (D)
the core (3%) and (E) the dMPFC subsystem
(3%), but explained a considerable amount of the
variance in activity within (F) the MTL subsystem
(31%).
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The Brain’s Default NetworkIn contrast to the constructive function of the MTL subsystem,
the dMPFC subsystem was preferentially active when partici-
pants considered their present mental states. Although item
analysis was unable to identify specific variables that selectively
accounted for activity within the dMPFC subsystem, 13% of its
variance was accounted for by the affective self-referential
composite (r = 0.36; p < 0.005). These results are consistent
with prior studies that report activation of the dMPFC subsystem
when information (especially affective information) is referenced
to one’s self (e.g., Lane et al., 1997; Gusnard et al., 2001; John-
son et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2005; Saxe et al., 2006; Vander-
wal et al., 2008; Lombardo et al., 2009; reviewed in Ochsner
et al., 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006).
Interestingly, regions within the dMPFC subsystem are also
activated when participants infer the mental states of other
people (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Saxe et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Lombardo et al., 2009;
reviewed in Frith and Frith, 2003; Ochsner et al., 2004; Amodio
and Frith, 2006). The possible neural overlap among affective,
self-referential, and social cognitive processes suggests
a broader role for this subsystem in either metacognition (Ochs-558 Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.ner et al., 2004), mental state inference
(Frith and Frith, 2003; Olsson and Ochs-
ner, 2008), social cognition (Mitchell,
2006), or the use of one’s own mental
states as a model for inferring the mental
states of others (Goldman, 1992). How-
ever, the precise interplay between
emotion, self-knowledge, and prediction
of other’s mental states is still under
current investigation, as many stimuli,
including those in the present study,confound these processes (see Olsson and Ochsner, 2008, for
a review).
Consistent with their possible role in integration as default
network hubs, the aMPFC and PCC shared functional properties
of both subsystems (Figure 2A), exhibiting preferential self-
related activity regardless of temporal context. Additionally,
item analyses revealed three variables that correlated with
activity in the aMPFC and PCC core: personal significance, intro-
spection about one’s own mental states, and evoked emotion
(Figure 7). Activity within the aMPFC and PCC is strongest for
events that actually happened (Hassabis et al., 2007a), are likely
to happen (Szpunar et al., 2009), or are consistent with one’s
personal future goals (D’Argembeau et al., 2009). Additionally,
the aMPFC (and often PCC) activates when participants make
judgments or remember trait adjectives about themselves
compared to other people (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; Lou et al.,
2004; Heatherton et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; D’Argembeau
et al., 2005) and the regions correlate with self-referential
thoughts (D’Argembeau et al., 2005) and perceived similarity or
closeness to one’s self (Mitchell et al., 2006). These collective
observations suggest that the hubs of the default network may
Neuron
The Brain’s Default Networkparticipate in evaluating aspects of personal significance (see
also D’Argembeau et al., 2009).
Both Subsystems Are Activated during Passive States,
when Participants Engage in Spontaneous Cognition
By exploring the anatomical and functional heterogeneity of the
default network using functional connectivity and task-related
analyses, we reveal that distinct components of the network
contribute differently to internal mentation. What is also novel
about the present results is that they suggest why the two
subsystems interact when individuals are left to think to them-
selves undisturbed. Indeed, classic meta-analyses of the default
network reveal that a number of regions exhibit greater activity
during passive epochs compared to a variety of controlled,
externally directed tasks (Shulman et al., 1997; Mazoyer et al.,
2001; see also Buckner et al., 2008, 2009; Spreng et al., 2009).
The present study suggests that these regions are organized
into two distinct subsystems that converge on midline hubs.
The joint activation of default network regions during uncon-
strained passive epochs and experimentally directed tasks
emphasizing internal mentation implies an important functional
similarity between the two states.
Early reports provided a clue to the nature of this similarity by
demonstrating that unconstrained passive states are associated
with ‘‘freely wandering past recollection, future plans, and other
personal thoughts and experiences’’ (Andreasen et al., 1995; see
also Binder et al., 1999; Mazoyer et al., 2001). Along a similar
vein, we recently demonstrated a link between spontaneous
cognition and default network activity during blocks of fixation,
with descriptions indicating that most thoughts were self-rele-
vant and affective in nature (J.R.A.-H. and R.L.B., unpublished
data). Thus, when left alone undisturbed, people tend to engage
in self-relevant internal cognitive processes predominantly about
significant past and future events. These spontaneous cognitive
operations likely coactivate multiple distinct subsystems that we
have come to know as the default network.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Overview
Three experiments characterized the organization and functions of the default
network. Experiment 1 analyzed intrinsic activity correlations between brain
regions to determine whether regions form coherent subsystems. Since
previous studies have demonstrated that low-frequency spontaneous BOLD
correlations between regions largely track direct and indirect anatomical
connectivity (reviewed in Fox and Raichle, 2007), experiment 1 was designed
to offer insight into the possible anatomical organization of the default network.
Two datasets were analyzed for this experiment. The first dataset (n = 28)
was used to generate candidate regions within the default network. The
second dataset (n = 45) was used to quantify, in an unbiased manner, pair-
wise correlations between regions. Graph-analytic techniques and hierar-
chical clustering analyses were then used to determine whether any regions
clustered together as components of coherent subsystems.
Experiment 2 explored the functional properties of the core and subsystems
using task-based fMRI (n = 46). Subjects made decisions about personal
events framed in the context of the present or the future while control ques-
tions asked about facts based on semantic knowledge (also referenced to
the present or the future). Next, functional magnitudes were extracted on
a trial-by-trial basis for each region within the default network followed by hier-
archical clustering and correlation analysis to examine functional similarities
between regions.Experiment 3 explored the component processes that tracked activation of
the default network subsystems using item analysis and strategy reports.
An independent group of subjects (n = 51) were probed in detail about strate-
gies they used for each trial. The answers to the strategy probes were then
examined to see which properties, if any, tracked activation of the subsystems
and the core that comprise the default network.
Participants
129 right-handed, native English speakers (23.0 years, 18–35, 47 male)
recruited from Harvard University, Massachusetts General Hospital, and the
greater Boston community participated in at least one of three experiments.
41 of the 129 participants completed both experiment 1, dataset 2 (intrinsic
functional connectivity), and experiment 2 (fMRI), bringing the total number
of independent data sessions to 170. Demographic information appears in
Table S4. Subjects were paid for participation or received course credit. MRI
exclusion criteria included history of psychiatric or neurological conditions
as well as use of psychoactive medications. Procedures were carried out
according to the Partners Health Care Institutional Review Board (experiments
1 and 2) and the Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects
in Research (experiment 3).
MRI Data Acquisition
Scanning was performed on a 3 Tesla Siemens Tim Trio system (Siemens,
Erlangen, Germany) using the vendor-supplied 12-channel phased-array
head coil. Magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo (MP-
RAGE) 3D T1-weighted anatomical images and T2*-weighted functional data
were acquired using procedures outlined in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures. Visual stimuli were programmed using Psychophysics Toolbox
software (Brainard, 1997) and were projected onto a computer screen posi-
tioned at the back of the scanner. The screen was viewed through an MRI-
compatible mirror. Participants wore plastic goggles with either neutral or
corrective lenses, were given ear plugs to dampen scanner noise, and used
a button box to relay their responses.
Experiment 1: Analysis of Default Network Architecture
Functional Connectivity Preprocessing and Analysis
Thegoal of the first experimentwas touse intrinsic activity correlations to inves-
tigate the anatomical heterogeneitywithin thedefault network. In an initial data-
set (dataset 1), 28 participants (21.0 years, 18–25, 10male) completedbetween
four and six resting state runs (run duration = 5min 12 s or 7min 9 s) comprised
of either eyes open fixation, eyes open without fixation, or eyes closed (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Default network ROIs were defined
in dataset 1 and then examined for clustering properties in an independent
test dataset (dataset 2) consisting of 45 participants (21.8 years, 18–30,
17 male) who each completed between two and four fixation runs (run
duration = 6 min 30 s). To prepare the MRI data for further analysis, a series
of standard preprocessing steps outlined in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedureswere performed on each dataset (reviewed in VanDijk et al., 2010).
Definition of Regions
A priori ROIs comprising the default network were defined in dataset 1 and
were then used to examine clustering properties in dataset 2. Two initiating,
2 mm radius seed regions were created from a default network meta-analysis
of fixation > task data published in Buckner et al. (2009): one near the left PHC
(28,40,12) and another within the dMPFC (4, 48, 24) based on our initial
observation of subsystems (Buckner et al., 2008). Several peak coordinates
were extracted from the group-averaged correlation maps for the PHC and
dMPFC and were converted into 8 mm radii spheres. These regions were
then examined for connectivity, and new regions were defined from the subse-
quent correlation maps. This series of seed and target correlation procedures
is similar to those adopted in our previous study (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2007).
To simplify the analysis, prevent biasing the structure toward the strong corre-
lations exhibited between mirrored (right/left) seed regions, and to avoid the
strong laterality observed for the lateral parietal ROIs (Liu et al., 2009), exclu-
sively left-lateralized ROIs were used resulting in 11 separate left-lateralized
or midline regions: dMPFC, aMPFC, vMPFC, pIPL, TPJ, LTC, TempP, PCC,
Rsp, PHC, and HF+ (Figures 2A and 2B; Table S1).Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 559
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The goal of the network analysis was to determine from the pair-wise regional
correlations whether the regions clustered into coherent subsystems (Buckner
et al., 2008, 2009). Graph analysis of the pair-wise (113 11) correlation matrix
was implemented using the ‘‘Kamada-Kawai algorithm,’’ a spring-embedded
algorithm that pulls connected regions (nodes) together and pushes discon-
nected regions apart in a manner that minimizes the total energy of the system
(Kamada and Kawai, 1989). Betweenness-centrality was used as a quantita-
tive measure of how connected a particular region was to other regions
(Freeman, 1977). The z-transformed correlation matrix was then analyzed
using a hierarchical-clustering average linkage algorithm (Cluster v3.0, 1988,
Stanford University) to provide quantitative evidence for subsystems within
the default network. See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for addi-
tional details.
Experiment 2: Functional Dissociation among Default Network
Subsystems
Experiment 2 sought to dissociate the functional contributions of the default
network components isolated from the first experiment by manipulating task
demands within an event-related fMRI study. 46 participants (21.7 years,
18–30, 17 male), 41 of whom also participated in the functional connectivity
session above (experiment 1, dataset 2), made self-referential or semantic
decisions about events framed in the present or the hypothetical future. By
manipulating questions that crossed these two factors, we sought to provide
clear evidence for task-based functional dissociation.
Task Paradigm
The paradigm was structured using a 23 2 design such that questions varied
with respect to whether the question was about the participant (Self-Rele-
vancy: Self versus Non-Self Control) and temporal orientation (Present versus
Future). The goal was to break down component processes that are evoked
when individuals imagine themselves in the future (i.e., prospection). The first
factor focused on self-relevant processing in contrast to assessments that rely
on general semantic knowledge. The second factor focused on the construc-
tive nature of imagined future events by contrasting questions about future
events with parallel assessments of the immediate present.
This design yielded four conditions: Present Self, Present Non-Self Control,
Future Self, Future Non-Self Control. In each of the four conditions, a context-
setting statement wasmade followed by a question. Three possible alternative
answers were provided, and subjects responded with a left-handed keypress.
Sentence structure, word number, and reading time were matched across the
four conditions. Participants were given 10 s to read the contextually orienting
sentence and choose their answer. 10 s of fixation separated trials, allowing
the hemodynamic response to decay. In this manner, hemodynamic response
estimates could be computed for individual trials. A total of 18 trials within each
condition were presented across four task runs (72 trials total). Order of trial
type was randomized within runs. Additional details are provided in the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Following each imaging session, the series of 72 questions was presented to
the participants again outside the scanner in a separate behavioral testing
room to confirm the experimental conditions differed as expected and to probe
the strategies used to answer the questions. Subjects were asked about the
various strategies they used to answer each question, including use of mental
imagery, vividness, anduseof self-projection. Subjects rated imagerybymarking
the appropriate location along a line between ‘‘none’’ and ‘‘a lot.’’ The distance
along the linewasmeasured and expressed as a decimal from1.0 to 10.0, where
1.0 represented ‘‘none’’ and 10.0 represented ‘‘a lot.’’ Vividness was rated using
the five-point Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973). To
gaugeuseof self-projection,participantsansweredthequestion ‘‘Towhatdegree
did you feel like you were there in your image’’? by marking the appropriate
location along a line between ‘‘not at all’’ or ‘‘like it was happening in real life.’’
Note that many aspects of the scenarios vary from question to question.
The four conditions captured broad differences and, as will be illustrated,
successfully modulated subsystems within the default network as a function
of the 2 3 2 design. However, the variance between individual questions is
also relevant. Experiment 3 explicitly explored trial-to-trial variation in the strat-
egies employed to answer the questions by probing the strategies used with
an extended set of strategy probes.560 Neuron 65, 550–562, February 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Data Processing and Statistical Analyses
A series of preprocessing steps described in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures section were performed on each dataset using SPM2 software
(SPM2, Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK). In addition
to examining contrasts between conditions, item analysis was also employed.
As described in the Results section, the group mean percent signal for each
trial was correlated between regions within the default network. Pair-wise
correlations were then subjected to a hierarchical clustering analysis (used
in experiment 1 and described above) that partitions the regions into succes-
sively larger clusters based on the similarities of their correlations.Experiment 3: Functional Analysis of Component Processes
Experiment 3 was conducted to further examine the underlying component
processes associated with activity increases across the four task conditions.
An independent group of 51 participants (25.2 years, 18–35, 18 male) an-
swered the same set of questions and rated whether they employed different
strategies to answer the questions. Their use of strategies was assessed for
each individual question using a Likert scale, where 1 represents ‘‘not at all’’
and 7 represents ‘‘a lot.’’
Critically, the three strategy probes employed in experiment 2 were again
presented for this independent group of subjects. The answers for these three
overlapping questions were strongly correlated between the two subject
groups (imagery: r = 0.90; vividness: r = 0.88; self-projection: r = 0.95), sug-
gesting that the present method of probing strategy use captures stable
properties of the individual trial questions. Thus, it is reasonable to ascertain
strategy assessments in this new group of subjects as a means to understand
the fMRI results collected in experiment 2. Eleven new strategy probes were
examined (see Table S3 for exact questions), and the mean strategy ratings
for each question across the 51 subjects where then used to predict functional
activation for each of the items in experiment 2. In this manner, the exact strat-
egies used to make each decision could be examined against fMRI response
variance to provide insight into the component processes engaged. Distinct
strategies that were similarly employed for each condition were combined
into composite measures by summing the z-scores of the individual strategies
comprising each composite. Two composites were created: one that included
assessment of personal significance (probe #1), introspection about one’s
preferences, feelings, and emotions (probe #2), and evoked emotion (probe
#3), and another that involved use of memory (probe #5), imagination (probe
#6), and spatial content (probe #7). Mean activity within the hubs and subsys-
tems separately was correlated with composite scores across participants.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
two figures, and four tables and can be found with this article online at
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